When dealing with contract cases, English courts make much of their commitment to contractual certainty.
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To an English common lawyer, U.S. law at times appears to have mutated into a hybrid system, part-common-law and part-civilian in character. This is the appearance presented by the Uniform Commercial Code, particularly Article 2, which seems to have acquired the character of a general contract statute. The ancestry of Article 2 can be traced back though the Uniform Sales Act 1906 to the UK Sale of Goods Act 1893. Both the 1893 Act (and its UK successor of 1979) and Article 2 contain a provision that allows access to the underlying common law, which is not a characteristic of civilian codes, but there are at least two features of Article 2 that strike an English common lawyer as civilian in character. The first is the rule of construction in UCC § 1-102(1) that the UCC be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies". The second is the emphasis placed on general principles, namely, the principles of unconscionability in § 2-302 and good faith in § 2-103(1)(j).
The first feature strikes me as licensing in extreme cases a type of interpretation that treats the text as a mere springboard for judicial flights of fancy. Does the text have to be ambiguous for this process to be open to a judge, or may the judge disregard the plain meaning of the text? Is the text itself just a historical document, to be updated by a court, or is it a continuing and constant point of reference? Is a "dynamic" interpretation of a text permissible?
My principal concern in this paper, however, is the second feature, the emphasis placed on general principles. I propose to state my misgivings about both unconscionability and good faith, drawing appropriate comparisons with English law. In focusing on unconscionability and good faith, I shall try so far as possible to take appropriate account of the difference between the way the law appears on the page and 4 the way it is applied in action. Judicial restraint, when exercised, can be a powerful inhibiting factor. Moreover, it is hard to resist the conclusion that some written law exists to make a moral demonstration -law as rhetoric rather than law in action. It may be that features of the UCC imparting to it an almost civilian flourish do not alter its true character as a mirror of the common law. It should not be forgotten, too, that English case law, with one Court of Appeal and one Supreme Court, is inherently more "manageable" than the case law of fifty jurisdictions, 7 and that the UCC and the Restatements should be viewed with this in mind.
In this short paper, I shall not make any claim about the general superiority of
English law, about which I have some misgivings. Contracts are interpreted in a contextual way that downplays the written word and opens up interpretation to a torrent of extrinsic evidence, at the same time eradicating the distinction between interpretation and implied terms. 8 In part, no doubt, because of the absence of a civil jury, the parol evidence rule has for a long time been more or less a dead letter, which has rendered English law particularly vulnerable to this modern interpretative approach. The controls placed upon implied terms over the last 100 years 9 have been no small bulwark against 7 See G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 62 (1974 German notions of a commercial zeitgeist. Article 2 is replete with references to "reasonable," "seasonable" and "usage," and at one time the merchant jury was seen as a conduit for giving practical expression to these notions. There is something of the antithesis of a code in such a legal philosophy. So far as the law tracks evolving mercantile usage, it throws off the shackles of a code.
The reality, however, was that the connection between Article 2 and mercantile usage, as intended by Llewellyn, never really took root. Judicial interpretation of (and judicial discretion relating to) particular expressions such as seasonable and reasonable by no means amounts to the same thing. There are times when, looking at Article 2, one wonders at its capacity to absorb almost indifferently commercial and consumer contracts. Just how "commercial" is 485, 559 (1967) . The introduction of exuberant words like "wholly,"
"disproportionately," "strikingly" and "grossly" does not assist.
14 Id. However, another commentator saw the direct appeal to unconscionability, instead of to indirect routes of judicial attack, as demonstrative of that same dictum. A. 41 The reasoning in the court inclines towards putting a duty on the plaintiff to bring the clause to the attention of the defendant, but this is inexact. Rather, he could not fairly interpret the defendant"s conduct as agreeing to be bound by the clause.
as a matter of procedure, the plaintiff had failed to take the necessary steps to have the clause incorporated in the contract. II agreements leave open certain major terms but impose upon the parties a duty to negotiate the remaining issues in good faith. Here the parties had concluded a "binding agreement," subject to the preparation and execution of documents satisfactory to both sides, 46 for a loan by plaintiff to defendant as part of a three-sided arrangement. The defendant was to sell the New York Daily News building on deferred payment terms to a third party and assign its payment rights to the plaintiff to pay down the loan. The reason for this structure was to provide the defendant with installment tax deferral of its gain on the sale of the building. Before the final agreement was prepared, the defendant halted the process until the plaintiff agreed that that the defendant might report the loan on its financial statement as an off-balance-sheet offset. 47 The plaintiff objected to this and claimed that the defendant was motivated by a drop in interest rates, which would have permitted it to refinance at cheaper rates if it backed out of the deal. Judge Leval held that, even if the agreement was incomplete, this was a Type II agreement and the parties had bound themselves to negotiate a final agreement in good faith. This the defendant had failed to do by raising the matter of offsetting. The court"s finding that the defendant 45 [1992] 2 A.C. 128. 46 In English law, this is known as a "subject to contract" agreement, the usual means of concluding a contract for the sale of land, where, even after months of negotiations, title searches and so on, either party can freely walk away from commitment. 47 The defendant was contemplating a public offering.
17 was in part actuated by the fall in interest rates appears to provide some sort of moralistic cover for its conclusion that the defendant was no longer free to rely upon the offset.
Turn next to the English case. Walford v. Miles is famous, even notorious, for
Lord Ackner"s assertion that "the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations." Short of contractual commitment, either party, therefore, is entitled to pursue its own interests without consideration for the interests of other party.
In Walford, the vendor walked away from the sale of a company because of concerns about the purchaser"s ability to manage it. The vendor was asked to provide a post-completion warranty of performance by the target company, and might be on the hook if the purchaser ran it poorly. The parties had agreed on a "lock-out" clause providing that, during the negotiation process, the vendor would terminate negotiations with and not entertain bids from third parties. The purchaser further claimed that the agreement contained an implied term to negotiate in good faith as long as the vendor desired to sell the target. It was this claim that attracted Lord Ackner"s assertion.
Presented as an implied term of a negotiation agreement, the claim failed to clear the long-standing barrier erected against judicial intervention in contracts, namely, that it be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. 48 The plaintiff"s claim was therefore never a strong one. Any attempt to reopen the position would be liable to rebuttal on two fronts: first, a negotiating party can substantially protect its interests by agreeing to a "break fees" clause to cover professional fees incurred in the negotiation process; 18 secondly, the incipient recognition of express agreements to negotiate in good faith puts the onus on plaintiffs to reach such an agreement.
The question whether good faith should be accorded a role in the negotiating process is akin to the question whether prior negotiations should be scrutinized in aid of interpreting a written contract, even at the expense of overriding the plain meaning of the written agreement. When, as a result of major trading reverses, the defendants decided not to renew its contractual relation with the plaintiffs, the latter sought to re-characterize the contractual relationship so as to treat it as a contract of indefinite duration, terminable only upon reasonable notice, the length of which would of course depend on the length of the preexisting relationship. Without even proceeding to trial, the court declined to imply the existence of an umbrella contract of indefinite duration, since this was not necessary as a matter of business efficacy. It also declined to find any binding representation that the defendants would continue to order garments into the future, partly on the ground of uncertainty -which garments in which styles and in which quantities? -and partly because any representation could not be used to found a cause of action. The defendants had set out deliberately not to create a long-term relationship recognized in law and they had succeeded. And who is to say the decision is wrong, when the defendants were suffering major and entrenched trading reverses and had commitments to their own employees and shareholders? English law does not recognise factual expectations in contract and this case was to be no exception.
It is not merely the case that English law does not allow waiver or promissory estoppel to ground a cause of action, in the way of section 90. Rather, so firmly is the doctrine of consideration still upheld that even a clear and specific promise to hold a contractual offer open will not be binding, 58 still less an offer upon which the other party 57 The witness statement of a former chairman of the defendants supplied to the plaintiffs. that maintains the need for consideration, there will always be a place for artificial contracts, especially of the unilateral kind, though it should not be imagined that their existence will freely be inferred. Such a contract might, for example, be found where a potential franchisee is encouraged to incur significant expense prior to the grant of the franchise on terms broadly agreed. 60 The inference of a contract of this kind should not be expected to arise as a routine matter, and it should not be supposed that one party"s precontract reliance costs will be re-characterized as benefit conferred on the other and thus subject to a restitutionary action.
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B. Performance and Enforcement
Section 205 of the Restatement Second imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the enforcement of contracts. When I looked at the scope of this duty some time ago, 62 I was struck by the way that reported cases invoking the good faith principle could readily be classified under the heads of interpretation and implied terms. So far as they engaged community standards, these could just as easily be expressed in terms of public policy or illegality, and all legal systems give a role more or less to such considerations.
Measuring the impact of good faith in American law by results, therefore, it was hardly a case of the New World, in a bout of prelapsarian nostalgia for its lost idealistic soul, meeting the cynical Old World in an encounter scripted by Henry James. Moreover, the same concern about the vacuity of unconscionability could be repeated for good faith.
The suspicion that good faith in section 205 might amount to little more than a moral flourish was also bolstered by the way that no sanction was stipulated for breach of the good faith standard. Even the unconscionability rule in UCC § 2-302 provides for a remedial outcome. As for the literature, the most substantial contributions came from Robert Summers, whose views of good faith may be summarized as "It"s what the courts 23 do anyway" and "You know bad faith when you see it," 66 and from Steven Burton, who in a sober piece found a rational underpinning for the existing rule of good faith in the prevention of attempts to recapture forgone contractual opportunities. 67 The two approaches could hardly have been more different. The one seemed intent on finding the presence of good faith behind formal legal reasoning, and the latter intent on minimizing its potential disruptive impact.
Has good faith made any headway in the last quarter of a century? Good faith still surfaces when contracts are interpreted and terms are implied. 68 The acid test for determining whether good faith does more than serve a rhetorical purpose is to see whether it is actually used to prevent one contracting party from rendering a type of performance or otherwise behaving in a way which would otherwise be permitted under the contract, or would restrict a party from enforcing contractual rights otherwise Despite this, it has been asserted that the duty of good faith is tantamount to a tortious duty and is therefore one that overrides the provisions of the contract. The
Supreme Court of Vermont, in a case where an fuel supplier was prevented from invoking an automatic termination clause triggered by the death of a key employee of the distributor, stated that "an action for its breach is really no different from a tort action, because the duty of good faith is imposed by law and is not a contractual term that the parties are free to bargain in or out as they see fit." 71 Thus the widow of the key employee had an expectation that the fuel company might negotiate a new agreement with her or buy her out at a fair price or allow her sufficient time to sell the business to a 69 Farnsworth observes that this is inconsistent with Comment 8 to UCC § 2-309 (3) which, dealing with reasonable notice of termination and the striking down as unconscionable of any contractual clause dispensing with reasonable notice, refers to good faith: Contracts §7.17 note 14 (3 rd ed 1999).
70 See, e.g., Dalton v. Educational Testing Service, 663 N.E.2d 289 (N.Y., 1985); Duquesne Light Co. v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 66 F.3d 604 (3d Cir., 1995) . 71 Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Co., 635 A.2d 1211 , 1216 (Vt., 1993 
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is not the function of the law to fashion a contract that a more equal balance of bargaining power might have produced.
It is comforting to be told that U.S. courts "generally utilize the good faith duty as an interpretive tool to determine "the parties" justifiable expectations", and do not enforce an independent duty divorced from the specific clause". Apart from this, it is useful to highlight a few key English cases whose outcome can only be described as repelling any duty of good faith and fair dealing. The clearest examples are to be found in the commodities trade. English courts have declined to prevent a buyer from terminating a contract for early shipment when the only reason for this has been that the rice market is in decline. 83 They have also prevented a buyer from substituting a ship nominated to lift a cargo when the original ship turned out to be unavailable, but a suitable and timely replacement could be found. The seller wished to quit the contract so as to take advantage of a rising market. 84 English courts have also allowed a short seller to insist upon a near-impossible requirement that a ship nominated to lift a cargo from a wide range of potential Australian ports be fit to enter every single port in the range, even though the Australian agency with a monopoly over barley exports 85 was prepared to find a cargo for the ship in question from some of those ports.
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The view apparently taken by the English courts is that the avoidance of an undesirable outcome in a given case is no reason to imperil commercial certainty when the contract, 
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direction that can be given to ensure orderly legal development and encourage investment in the future through the contracting process.
